

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PHELPS COUNTY
STATE OF MISSOURI

TREVOR WHITE; TERRENCE CORRIGAN,
SR.; SARAH M. SERABIAN; and ASTORRIA
SASSANO; individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PBM NUTRITIONALS, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company,

Defendant.

Case No. 22PH-CV00931

**SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR AN ATTORNEYS’
FEES AND COSTS AWARD, AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE AWARDS**

Plaintiffs Trevor White, Terrence Corrigan, Sr., Sarah M. Serabian, and Astorria Sassano (“Plaintiffs”), Individually and as Class Representatives on Behalf of All Similarly Situated Persons and a proposed Settlement Class, respectfully submit this Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Award, and Class Representative Service Awards.

I. INTRODUCTION

After substantial negotiation, the parties agreed to settle this matter as reflected in the Class Action Settlement Agreement, filed July 21, 2022 (the “Settlement”). As part of the Settlement, the parties agreed that Defendant shall pay attorneys’ fees and costs awarded by the Court to Class Counsel in an amount not to exceed \$600,000, and Class Representative Service Awards in an amount not to exceed \$17,500 in the aggregate. See Settlement ¶¶ 7.1-7.3. The Attorneys’ Fees and Cost Award was negotiated at arms’ length and with the direct supervision of a neutral,

nationally renowned mediator, Hon Wayne Andersen (Ret.). The Settlement provides that any order or proceedings related to fees and costs will not affect the finality of the Settlement or the benefits available thereunder to the Class. *Id.* ¶ 7.2.

Accordingly, Class Counsel and Plaintiffs respectfully submit this Motion seeking an Attorneys' Fees and Costs award of \$600,000, inclusive of costs and expenses, and Class Representative Service Awards in the total amount of \$3,500 individually, and up to \$17,500 in the aggregate. As is demonstrated below, this valuable settlement was achieved because of the skill, tenacity, and effective advocacy of Class Counsel. The requested fee is fair and reasonable, supported by applicable Missouri law, and consistent with prevailing awards in class action litigation in the area. For these reasons, among the others stated herein, Class Counsel respectfully ask the Court to grant the requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award, and Class Representative Service Awards in the requested sums.

II. EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF LEAD CLASS COUNSEL'S MOTION

Lead Class Counsel asks the Court to take judicial notice of the file in this proceeding as an additional basis for the award of fees, with specific reference to: the Motion and Suggestions in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, and the Declaration of L. DeWayne Layfield, Lead Class Counsel, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit A ("Layfield Decl.").

III. SETTLEMENT BENEFITS OBTAINED AND VALUE OF THOSE BENEFITS

The Settlement provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement with significant benefits to the Class. The benefits are described in detail in the Settlement.

IV. BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL SUMMARY

A. The Settlement is the Result of Class Counsel's Effective Litigation Strategy.

Plaintiffs brought this case based on allegations that Defendant PBM Nutritionals, LLC

(“Defendant”) deceptively and unlawfully packaged, marketed and labeled its powder baby and infant formulas under the following brands: Well Beginnings, Meijer Bay, Little Journey, Wesley Farms, Burt’s Bees Baby, Berkley Jensen, Parent’s Choice, Earth’s Best Organic, Comforts, Up & Up, Babies “R” Us, Member’s Mark, and Bobbie Baby, which are sold in a variety of sizes, and collectively referred to herein as “Products” or a “Product.” Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant represented that the Products make a certain number of fluid-ounce bottles of formula; however, contrary to these representations, the Products contain nowhere near enough powder formula to make the represented number of bottles of liquid formula when following the “Instructions for Preparation & Use” on the side labels of the Products.

Prior to filing suit and during the pendency of the case, Class Counsel conducted a detailed investigation and analysis of the Products, engaged in thorough and extensive investigation into the facts, and fashioned an appropriate remedy to serve the best interests of the Class. The investigation and discovery have included:

- (i) engaging in a substantial pre-suit investigation for more than 8 months regarding the actual number of bottles of liquid formula the Products make compared to the represented amounts, including by working with laboratories and independent consultants;
- (ii) researching the applicable law with respect to the claims asserted and potential defenses thereto;
- (iii) coordination and consolidation by the law firms representing Plaintiffs in the Action; and
- (iv) engaging in extensive discussions and negotiations with defense counsel, including a half-day mediation session with the Hon. Wayne Andersen

(Ret.) of JAMS, and approximately 2 weeks of follow up negotiations.

This action required considerable skill and experience to result in such a successful conclusion. The case required investigation and a mastery of complex factual circumstances, the ability to develop creative legal theories, and the skill to respond to a host of legal defenses. In addition, Defendant was represented by the prominent and well-respected law firm of Duane Morris, LLP. As a result, this class action case against Defendant required substantial advanced planning, strategic skills, imagination, resourcefulness, and management abilities of the highest order to match a highly qualified, experienced, and formidable opposition. The prosecution and settlement of this litigation required a very high degree of competence, experience, and ability by Class Counsel.

B. The Settlement is the Result of Intense Negotiation.

Plaintiffs' extensive litigation preparation, the experience of Class Counsel, as well as Plaintiffs' effective and coordinated litigation strategy, has made settlement possible. This Settlement is a product of engagement between the Parties, which was preceded by intensive case investigation by Plaintiffs. Since shortly after delivery of a demand letter and an exchange of initial telephone conversations between the Parties, the Parties had been engaged in intensive settlement discussions for over five months. Those settlement efforts included: an initial settlement demand; provision of Plaintiffs' laboratory test results to Defendant; informal discovery from Defendant to Plaintiffs; informal settlement discussions between the parties; a half-day mediation with a neutral mediator, the Hon. Wayne Andersen (Ret.) of JAMS; and additional follow-up negotiations after the mediation, which ultimately resulted in the Settlement Agreement.

The Parties worked diligently to understand the underlying business facts in a completely transparent process. After disclosure and analysis of the facts, it was clear that the most appropriate remedy included both monetary and injunctive relief.

Indeed, the Settlement was not executed until after Class Counsel had: (1) conducted an extensive and comprehensive pre-suit investigation relating to the events and transactions underlying Plaintiffs' claims prior to filing the original Petition, including based on substantial testing and analysis of the Products conducted by an independent laboratory retained by Class Counsel; (2) thoroughly researched the law and facts pertinent to Plaintiffs' claims and potential defenses raised by Defendant, and assessed the risks of prevailing on each of the respective claims on pre-trial motions and at trial; (3) engaged in substantial coordination between each counsel for Plaintiffs in the Action, including in an effort to achieve a unified strategy and result; and (4) engaged in a careful and thorough exchange of information as part of the mediation process, including related to confidential business information.

V. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

In the face of contested litigation, with a case asserting claims predicated on complex legal and factual issues that were opposed by highly skilled and experienced defense counsel, Class Counsel succeeded in securing a meaningful benefit for the Class. The requested fee is fair and reasonable when considered under applicable legal standards. Indeed, as discussed below, the award is within the normal range of awards made in class action and contingent-fee matters of this type, and is particularly appropriate here in view of both the substantial risks attendant in bringing and pursuing this action, and the significant results achieved.

The Court should determine an award of attorneys' fees and costs according to established rules of law. This procedure is similar to those established in other class actions where a defendant, as in this case, has agreed to pay class counsel's attorneys' fees and have agreed not to contest fees

up to a certain cap.¹

A. There is No Fixed Standard or Any Absolute Measure for the Fee Award.

“The trial court is considered an expert at awarding attorney’s fees, and may do so at its discretion.” *Bachman v. A.G. Edwards, Inc.*, 344 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011), quoting *Weissenbach v. Deeken*, 291 S.W.3d 361, 362 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009). “To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the complaining party must show the trial court’s decision was against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one’s sense of justice.” *Russell v. Russell*, 210 S.W.3d 191, 199 (Mo. banc 2007).

“The factors to be considered in determining reasonable value of attorneys’ fees in Missouri are (1) time, nature, character and amount of services rendered, (2) nature and importance of the litigation, (3) degree of responsibility imposed on or incurred by the attorney, (4) the amount of money or property involved, (5) the degree of professional ability, skill and experience called for and used, and (6) the result achieved.” *Koppe v. Campbell*, 318 S.W.3d 233, 242 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010); *Reid v. Reid*, 906 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995).

B. The Settlement Includes a “Fee-Shifting” Agreement.

Missouri courts generally follow the American Rule, which requires each party to bear the expense of its attorneys’ fees. *Lorenzini v. Short*, 312 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). However, a contractual agreement between the parties which provides that one will pay the other’s attorneys’ fees is a well-recognized exception. *See, gen., Lucas Stucco & EIFS Design, LLC v.*

¹ *Ohio Public Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods*, 546 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio, E.D. 1982); *In Re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation*, 83 F.R.D. 305 (D. Md. 1979); *Arenson v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago*, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974); *Mazur v. Behrens*, 1974-2 Trade Cases §75,213 (N.D. Ill., 1974); *Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corporation*, 59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1972); *City of Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.*, 345 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); *see also, AAMCO Automatic Transmissions v. Tayloe*, 82 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1979); 2 *Newberg On Class Actions* §12.03 (3d ed. 1992).

Landau, 324 S.W.3d 444, 445 (Mo. banc 2010) (“attorney fees are recoverable ... when the contract provides for attorney fees.”); *Brooke Drywall of Columbia, Inc. v. Building Const. Enterprises, Inc.*, 361 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (“Attorneys’ fees are not generally recoverable in the United States, but they may become so if a statute **or the parties’ contract so provides.**”) (emphasis supplied); *Klinkerfuss v. Cronin*, 289 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (“Missouri adheres to the American Rule, meaning that generally, absent statutory authorization or **contractual agreement**, each litigant pays his or her own attorneys’ fees, with few exceptions.”) (emphasis supplied).

In the present case, the parties have entered into an agreement that “Class Counsel may file a request for an Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Award that is less than or equal to \$600,000 (six hundred thousand dollars) in the aggregate, which will cover the attorneys’ fees and costs awarded by the Court to Class Counsel for all the past, present, and future attorneys’ fees, costs (including court costs), expenses, and disbursements incurred by them and their experts, staff, and consultants in connection with the Action.” Settlement ¶ 7.1. It is well-established that parties may enter into such a fee-shifting agreement. *See generally, Evans v. Jeff D.*, 475 U.S. 717, 733-34 (1986) (“a rule prohibiting the comprehensive negotiation of all outstanding issues in a pending case [specifically including claims for attorney fees in a class action] might well preclude the settlement of a substantial number of cases”) citing *Marek v. Chesny* 473 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[M]any a defendant would be unwilling to make a binding settlement offer on terms that left it exposed to liability for attorney’s fees in whatever amount the court might fix on motion of the plaintiff”); *see also Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation. Ideally, of course, litigants will settle the amount of a fee.”).

Accordingly, courts routinely acknowledge that parties may settle claims for attorneys’

fees in a class action by entering into an agreement—as the parties have done in the present case—that the defendant will pay the plaintiff’s fees. *See* 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed.) § 12:3 (“defendants in a class action settlement may properly agree to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses”); *see, e.g., Neel v. Strong*, 114 S.W.3d 272, 273 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (“As part of the settlement, the Attorney General and the tobacco companies agreed that the tobacco companies would pay the fees of the outside counsel.”); *Wing v. Asarco Inc.*, 114 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1997) (“At the outset, we note that the fee dispute in this case arises [not from a statute or common fund, but] out of contract: in the Settlement Agreement, Asarco agreed to pay the reasonable attorney fees and expenses as determined and awarded by the court.”); *Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.*, 925 F.2d 518, 523 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that when parties to class action have reached a “clear sailing” fee-shifting agreement as part of settlement, trial court may determine and award reasonable fees “even where no fee-shifting statute or common law exception thrives”); *Deloach v. Philip Morris Companies*, 2003 WL 23094907, *4 at n. 2 (M.D.N.C. December 19, 2003) (“the present petition [for attorney fees] was brought pursuant to a private [settlement] agreement among the parties.”), citing *Wing*, 114 F.3d at 989; *Evans v. Jeff D.*, 475 U.S. at 738 n. 30 (parties may simultaneously negotiate a “defendant’s liability on the merits and his liability for his opponents’ attorney’s fees.”); *In re TJX Companies Retail Sec. Breach Litigation*, 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting that basis for awarding fees was “part of the Agreement, [in which Defendant] agreed to pay court-approved attorneys’ fees not to exceed \$6,500,000.”); *Browne v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, No. NO. CV 09-06750 (C.D. Cal. October 10, 2010) (“[a] settlement agreement is a binding contract” and “contractual provisions providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees . . . provide a basis for awarding fees.”)

(internal citations omitted).²

C. The Reasonableness of the Requested Fee is Confirmed by Analysis of the Applicable Factors.

1. The time, nature, character, and amount of services rendered.

In support of this request, Plaintiffs submit the Layfield Decl. (*see* Ex. A). Here, the primary goal of Class Counsel and the Class Representatives was to obtain, by settlement or judgment, the best overall common benefit for the Class Members at the earliest reasonable time. The reality of complex litigation against a well-represented Defendant with creative and robust litigation tactics was an anticipated obstacle that Class Counsel considered and sought to overcome from the beginning. The results obtained by Class Counsel through the Settlement owe more to the strategy employed and quality of the work product than sheer time and labor. The mere expenditure of time and labor does not necessarily move a complex action such as this towards certification, judgment, or settlement. Class Counsel did not burden the Class Members or the Court with unnecessary delay nor wasted time or labor.

Here, Class Counsel undertook this action on a contingent fee basis (with the amount of any fee being subject to Court approval), assuming a substantial risk that the litigation would yield no recovery and leave them uncompensated. Courts have consistently recognized that the risk of

² Even if the present Settlement did not include a fee-shifting agreement, the relief provided to the Class would nonetheless support an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to Class Counsel under the equity-based substantial benefit/"balancing of the benefits" theory or the "unusual circumstances" exception to the American Rule. An award under "balancing of the benefits" would be appropriate. *See Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel, Inc.*, 360 S.W.2d 652, 661 (Mo. banc 1962); *Lett v. City of St. Louis*, 24 S.W.3d 157, 162-63 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000); *Feinberg v. Adolf K. Feinberg Hotel Trust*, 922 S.W.2d 21, 26 (Mo.App. E.D.1996). A "special circumstances" award would be appropriate. *See, Klinkerfuss v. Cronin*, 289 S.W.3d 607 (Mo.App. E.D. 2009); *Goellner v. Goellner Printing*, 226 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Mo.App. E.D. 2007); *Volk Const. Co. v. Wilmescherr Drusch Roofing Co.*, 58 S.W.3d 897 (Mo.App. E.D. 2001); *Temple Stephens Co. v. Westenhaver*, 776 S.W.2d 438, 443 (Mo.App. W.D. 1989). Of course, the Court need not resolve whether fees could be awarded under such theories because the Parties here have clearly agreed that Defendant will pay Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs. *See* Settlement at VII.

receiving little or no recovery is a major factor in considering an award of attorneys' fees. For example, one court explained the risks of contingent fees in complex litigation as follows:

Although today it might appear that risk was not great based on Prudential Securities' global settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, such was not the case when the action was commenced and throughout most of the litigation. Counsel's contingent fee risk is an important factor in determining the fee award. Success is never guaranteed and counsel faced serious risks since both trial and judicial review are unpredictable. Counsel advanced all of the costs of litigation, a not insubstantial amount, and bore the additional risk of unsuccessful prosecution.

In re Prudential-Bache Energy Income Partnerships Securities Litigation, No. 888, 1994 WL 202394, *6 (E.D. La. May 18, 1994). Indeed, the risk of no recovery in complex cases of this type is very real. There are numerous class actions in which plaintiff's counsel expended thousands of hours of effort and yet received no remuneration whatsoever despite their diligence and expertise.³ Simply put, it would not have been economically prudent or feasible if Class Counsel were to pursue the case under any prospect that the Court would award a fee on the basis of "normal" hourly rates applied in other types of litigation.

³ See, e.g., *Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc.*, 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997) (jury verdict of \$81 million for plaintiffs against an accounting firm reversed on appeal on loss causation grounds and judgment entered for defendant); *Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp.*, 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997) (Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants); *Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co.*, 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996) (Tenth Circuit overturned securities fraud class action jury verdict for plaintiffs in case filed in 1973 and tried in 1988 on the basis of 1994 Supreme Court opinion); *In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig.*, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,252 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1991) (class won jury verdict against two individual defendants, but court vacated judgment on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); *Backman v. Polaroid Corp.*, 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (where the class won a substantial jury verdict and motion for judgment n.o.v. was denied, on appeal the judgment was reversed and the case was dismissed—after 11 years of litigation); *Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) (multimillion dollar judgment reversed after lengthy trial); *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes*, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (judgment for \$145 million overturned after years of litigation and appeals), *modified*, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), *rev'd*, 409 U.S. 363 (1973).

In the present case, Class Counsel anticipated that the case would be vigorously defended with vast resources by superlative opposing legal counsel. Layfield Decl., at ¶ 9. Class Counsel anticipated an aggressive defense strategy that would pursue every possible forum and strategy to stop the case progress and to exhaust Class Counsel's resources. It has been the experience of Class Counsel that plaintiffs in complex class actions have to prevail on essentially all substantive and procedural issues in order to succeed. The defendant, on the other hand, only has to prevail on any one—be it defeating class certification, reversing class certification, or undermining substantive claims on legal or factual grounds. Class Counsel expended the necessary time and labor required to prosecute this action to a favorable conclusion, which included a significant expenditure of pre-suit effort and expense based, on substantial investigation of the Products. Class Counsel undertook this action on a contingent fee basis (with the amount of any fee being subject to Court approval), assuming a substantial risk that the litigation might yield no recovery whatsoever, and leave Class Counsel uncompensated.

Although Class Counsel are highly experienced law firms, they do not have the attorney and economic resources of Defendant. When Class Counsel undertakes major litigation, such as this litigation against Defendant, it necessarily limits Class Counsel's ability to undertake other complex litigation. During the course of this litigation, Class Counsel devoted significant hours and resources to the litigation. *See* Layfield Decl. at ¶ 17. Class Counsel had to make this commitment at the outset of the case, without knowing how long the case would take or if it would ever successfully resolve. Therefore, Class Counsel's willingness to prosecute this action on a contingent fee basis, and willingness to advance costs, caused them to divert both human and financial resources that were expended on this action from other cases.

2. *The nature and importance of the litigation.*

Because consumers read and rely on label representations, it is incumbent upon sellers of

consumer products to represent such products accurately and with integrity. Consumers rely upon manufacturers and retailers to label their products in a manner that is truthful and not misleading. This case is important because it sought to restore honesty where Plaintiffs allege it was lacking. The litigation ensures that Defendant PBM Nutritionals, LLC will truthfully and accurately disclose the number of fluid-ounce bottles of formula that can be made from the Products, and provides recompense for those who were misled.

3. *The degree of responsibility imposed on or incurred by attorneys.*

In taking on this case, Plaintiffs' Class Counsel incurred a great degree of responsibility. Class Counsel took on the hefty responsibility of enforcing the consumer rights of individual citizens against a large, well-funded corporation. Were this litigation unsuccessful in obtaining meaningful relief, the consumers represented by Class Counsel may not otherwise be able to stand up for their rights, including for fair and accurate product labeling and to receive the benefit of their bargain for purchased products.

4. *The amount of money or property involved.*

This case involved a substantial amount of money. Defendant sold millions of products to U.S. consumers during the Class Period. To that end, Class Counsel was able to secure a monetary benefit for the Class whereby Defendant agreed to provide cash benefits under a two-tiered structure with a gross potential payout of \$2 million. Class members have the ability to claim \$2.00 per Unit purchased, up to \$10.00 where Class Members do not have a valid Proof of Purchase, and up to \$30.00 with a valid Proof of Purchase. *See* Settlement ¶ 5.2. In addition, Defendant is paying for all notice and administration costs, as well as providing meaningful injunctive relief. The requested fees and costs are appropriate, and proportional to the monetary benefits available to the class.

5. *The Programmatic Relief.*

In negotiating this Settlement, the first term that Plaintiffs insisted be agreed was the Programmatic Relief—a correction of the challenged label claims. Layfield Decl., at ¶ 12. Indeed, the Programmatic Relief is the most valuable component of the Settlement for Class Members. Even if no monetary benefits accrued to Class Members, the reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Cost Award sought by Class Counsel is more than supported by the Programmatic Relief alone.

Of critical importance to the Settlement was the meaningful Programmatic Relief which Class Counsel insisted that Defendant undertake to right the alleged labeling wrongs. As described in detail in the Settlement Agreement, beginning no later than nine (9) months after the date of the Preliminary Approval Order and ending on the three (3) year anniversary of the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (“Restricted Period”), Defendant shall either: (1) remove the Challenged Language from the Labeling of the Products (referred to herein as “Option 1”); or (2) revise the Challenged Language such that the representations regarding the number of bottles of formula that each Product can deliver shall be based on the number of bottles that can be made from the powder contents of the Product when following the instructions printed on the Product’s labels for preparation of an individual bottle.

An assessment of the value of the Programmatic Relief should be viewed in light of the following facts:

- Defendant would not have made the required changes to the Products’ labeling except in response to the Class claims that are the subject of the Settlement;
- Defendant has not yet changed the labeling of the Products to provide this Programmatic Relief;

- For the 52-week period ending June 30, 2022, Defendant sold approximately 1,150,000 units of the Product in the United States. *See* Layfield Decl., at ¶ 18. For clarity that is the number of units of Product sold, not the dollars of revenue; and
- In the Settlement Agreement Defendant agreed that a compromise payment in the amount of \$2.00 per unit was appropriate to compensate Class Members for the damage or loss they suffered because of purchasing the Products, which provided fewer 4-ounce bottles of infant formula than represented on the Products labels.

Based on application of these facts, the Programmatic Relief is by far the most valuable component of the Settlement to Class Members. Using \$2.00 per unit as the damage or loss avoided by each Class Member on future purchases of the Product, and estimating units sold per year to be 1,150,000 units as the number of units sold in the United States each year (equating to approximately 95,833 units sold per month), and limiting the Programmatic Relief benefit to only the bare minimum 27 month period of Programmatic Relief mandated by the Settlement, demonstrates the Programmatic Relief is valued at: $(\$2.00 * 95,833 \text{ units/month} * 27 \text{ months}) = \$5,174,982.00$. *See* Layfield Decl., at ¶ 18. Even if one assumes sales of the Product were to decline, due to market competition, during the (bare minimum) 27-month period of Programmatic Relief, under any reasonable interpretation of the facts, the value of the Programmatic Relief is substantially greater than the \$2,000,000 cash fund also provided by the Defendant. It is also important to point out that Class Members do not need to file a claim form to receive the benefits of the Programmatic Relief.⁴

⁴In this Action, the damage calculus is simple and does not require expert opinion. Here, the label of the Product promised a certain number of bottles of infant formula could be made

6. ***The degree of professional ability, skill, and experience called for and used.***

Class Counsel are highly experienced in class action, commercial, *qui tam*, mass tort, securities and other complex litigation. Class Counsel have successfully prosecuted and settled numerous class actions, including consumer and securities class actions. Additionally, Class Counsel have prosecuted cases against some of the world's largest corporations in contingent fee litigation and are among the most experienced complex litigation attorneys in the country.

This action required considerable skill and experience to bring it so expeditiously to such a successful conclusion. The case required substantial pre-suit investigation, examination and mastery of complex factual circumstances, the ability to develop creative legal theories, and the skill to respond to a host of legal defenses. In addition, Defendant was represented by the prominent and well-respected law firm of Duane Morris LLP. The preeminent standing of opposing counsel should be weighed in determining the fee, because such standing reflects the challenge faced by Plaintiffs' attorneys.⁵ Indeed, this class action required advance planning, strategic skills, imagination, resourcefulness, and management abilities of the highest order to match a highly qualified, experienced and formidable opposition. Moreover, the Court's experience with Class Counsel forms the basis for assessing the nature, extent and quality of the services rendered by Class Counsel.⁶ The ability of Class Counsel to obtain such a settlement so

following the label directions, but laboratory testing shows that on average 10% fewer bottles can be made than promised. The damage calculus is therefore simple arithmetic: average purchase price per unit * 10%. It is analogous to buying a can of eight ready to bake biscuits, but upon opening the can discovering there are only seven biscuits. The customer bargained for eight biscuits but received only seven. The damages are 1/8 of the purchase price. The simplicity of the damage model in this Action, likewise, greatly simplifies the calculation of the value of the Programmatic Relief to the Class.

⁵ See *In re King Res. Co. Sec. Litig.*, 420 F. Supp. 610, 634 (D. Colo. 1976).

⁶ *Butt*, 98 S.W.3d at 11-12; *Chrisco*, 800 S.W.2d at 719; *Brown*, 838 F.2d at 453; *In Re King Res. Co. Sec. Litig.*, 420 F. Supp. at 628.

expeditiously for the Class, in the face of such formidable legal opposition, confirms the superior quality of Class Counsel's representation.

7. *The result achieved.*

The Settlement provides important and significant monetary and Programmatic Relief for the Class. The parties have agreed that:

- Tier 1. Settlement Class Members who elect to fill out the Claim Form section for Tier 1 and who do not have valid Proof of Purchase may recover \$2.00 per Unit purchased, up to a maximum of \$10.00 per Household; or
- Tier 2. Settlement Class Members who elect to fill out the Claim Form section for Tier 2 and who provide valid Proof(s) of Purchase may recover \$2.00 per Unit purchased for the number of Units for which a valid Proof of Purchase has been provided, up to a maximum of \$30.00 per Household.
- Defendant shall commence the process necessary to remove the Challenged Language or revise the Challenged Language such that the representations regarding the number of bottles of formula that each Product can deliver shall be based on the number of bottles that can be made from the powder contents of the Product when following the instructions printed on the Product's labels for preparation of an individual bottle beginning not later than nine (9) months after the date of entry by the Court of the Preliminary Approval Order (the "PAO Date"). Defendant shall not manufacture any Products with Labeling containing the Challenged Language during the period (the "Restricted Period") beginning on the ninth-month anniversary of the PAO Date and ending on the 3-year anniversary of the PAO Date. However, Defendant shall be permitted to sell existing Product inventory and Products manufactured prior to the Restricted Period in the ordinary course of business and not required to withdraw, destroy, or recall any Products. *See* Settlement Section V.

D. Deference is Given to Arms' Length Negotiated Fees.

The fee provisions of the Settlement were not negotiated until after the substantive terms of the settlement had been agreed upon. *See* Layfield Decl., at ¶ 21. This is the standard and ethical manner of negotiating settlement and fee issues. 3 *Newberg on Class Actions*, §12.03. The type of fee provision in the Settlement also is customary. *Id.* In this case, the fees were negotiated at arms' length and reflect a compromise—Plaintiffs accepted less and Defendant paid more, in order to achieve an appropriate and fair balance for the case.

E. The Class Representatives Deserve Service Awards for their Participation and Prosecution of these Claims on Behalf of the Class.

The Class Representatives have participated in the preparation and prosecution of this class action litigation; have been active in all phases of this litigation; and provided all necessary information required to successfully settle this case. Overall, the Class Representatives devoted a significant amount of time to this matter.

Courts routinely approve service awards to compensate Class Representatives for the services they provided and the risks they incurred during the course of the class action litigation.⁷

The purpose of a service award is to compensate the Class Representatives for both the extra work and risks undertaken by them that led to the creation of the benefits shared by the entire class.⁸

“Many cases note the obvious public policy reasons for encouraging individuals with small personal stakes to serve as class plaintiffs in meritorious cases.” *NACA Class Action Guidelines—Revised 2006 (Guideline 5)* (citing *Cook v. Niedert*, 142 F.3d 1104, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998); *In re*

⁷ This is expressly recognized by the NACA (National Association of Consumer Advocates) Class Action Guidelines (Revised 2006)—Guideline 5 (“Serving as a class representative generally requires significantly greater effort and sometimes, greater risk than is required of the absent class members. In addition, the class representative’s willingness to serve in that capacity enables the litigation to be brought in the first place.”)

⁸ See *In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation*, No. MDL 1261, 2004 WL 1221350 (E.D. Pa. June 02, 2004) (\$25,000 incentive award approved for each of the five class representatives); *Cullen v. Whitman Medical Group*, 197 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (value of settlement was \$7.3 million; six plaintiffs granted incentive awards of \$1,900.00 to \$10,400); *Roberts v. Texaco, Inc.*, 979 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (value of settlement was \$115 million; six plaintiffs granted incentive awards ranging from \$2,500 to \$85,000); *In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litig.*, 2005 WL 2230314 (D.N.J.2005) (value of settlement was \$36 million; incentive payments totaling \$75,000 for six named plaintiffs); *Cook v. Niedert*, 142 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1998) (value of settlement was \$ 14 million; incentive award to class representative of \$25,000); *Enterprise Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.*, 137 F.R.D. 240 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (value of settlement was \$56.6 million dollars; incentive awards of \$50,000 for each of the six class representatives); *In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Services Customer Litig.*, 130 F.R.D. 366 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (value of settlement was \$18 million; incentive awards to five class representatives from \$35,000 to \$55,000).

Cendant Corp., 232 F. Supp.2d 327, 344 (D.N.J. 2002); *Van Vracken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). In this case, the Class Representatives' participation has assisted in the prosecution and ultimate settlement of this action.

Defendant agreed as part of the Settlement to pay Service Awards in equal amounts to the Class Representatives of \$3,500 each, and up to a maximum total amount of \$17,500 in the aggregate, to compensate for their efforts in bringing the Action and achieving the benefits of the Settlement on behalf of the Settlement Class. Settlement ¶ 7.3.

“Awards of up to \$5,000 should not require overly particularized court examination before approval. In most cases, payment below that amount can be justified by the bare fact that the class representative consented to act on behalf of the absent class members, assuming the fiduciary responsibilities and inconveniences that accompany that role.” *NACA Class Action Guidelines—Revised 2006 (Guideline 5)*. Class Counsel believe the participation of the Class Representatives is deserving of the maximum agreed-upon award, and respectfully request that the Court award Service Awards to: Trevor White, Terrence Corrigan, Sr., Sarah M. Serabian, and Astorria Sassano in the amount of \$3,500 individually, and up to \$17,500 in the aggregate.

VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For all the reasons set forth herein, Lead Class Counsel request that this Motion be granted; that Class Counsel be awarded \$600,000 in attorneys' fees and costs; and that the Court grant Service Awards of \$3,500 each to Class Representatives Trevor White, Terrence Corrigan, Sr., Sarah M. Serabian, and Astorria Sassano.

Dated this 11th day of October, 2022.

TREVOR WHITE, TERRENCE CORRIGAN, SR.,
SARAH M. SERABIAN, and ASTORRIA SASSANO,

Individually, and on Behalf of Classes of Similarly Situated
Individuals, Plaintiffs

By: /s/ Bryce Crowley

David L. Steelman, #27334MO

david@sgclawfirm.com

Bryce Crowley, #64800MO

bryce@sgclawfirm.com

STEELMAN GAUNT CROWLEY

901 Pine Street, Suite 110

Rolla, Missouri 65401

Tel: (573) 341-8336

Fax: (573) 341-8548

Scott A. Kamber, #70534MO

skamber@kamberlaw.com

KAMBERLAW LLC

201 Milwaukee Street, Suite 200

Denver, CO 80206

Tel: (303) 222-9008

Fax: (212) 202-636

L. DeWayne Layfield (admitted by *PHV*)

dewayne@layfieldlaw.com

LAW OFFICE OF L. DEWAYNE LAYFIELD, PLLC

P.O. Box 3829

Beaumont, TX, 77704

Tel: (409) 832-1891

Fax: (866) 280-3004

Lydia Sturgis Zbrzezny (admitted by *PHV*)

lydia@southernatlanticlaw.com

Nicholas T. Zbrzezny (admitted by *PHV*)

nick@southernatlanticlaw.com

SOUTHERN ATLANTIC LAW GROUP, PLLC

99 6th Street SW

Winter Haven, FL 33880

Tel: (863) 656-6672

Fax: (863) 301-4500

Howard Rubinstein (admitted by *PHV*)

howard@pdq.com

THE LAW OFFICE OF HOWARD W. RUBINSTEIN

1281 N. Ocean Dr. Apt. 198

Singer Island, FL 33404

Tel: (913) 206-7575

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of October, 2022, the foregoing document was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the e-filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

/s/ Bryce Crowley
Bryce Crowley